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Terrorism, dread risk and bicycle accidents
Peter Ayton∗ Samantha Murray† James A. Hampton†
Abstract
Following the airplane attacks of September 11th, 2001 it is claimed that many Americans, dreading a repeat of these events,
drove instead of flying, and that, consequently, there were extra car accidents, increasing the number of fatalities directly
caused by the attacks by 1,500. After the Madrid train bombings of March 11th, 2004, Spaniards, like Americans, avoided the
attacked mode of travel, but no increase in car travel or fatal accidents resulted. Here we analyze behavioral concomitants of
the July 7th 2005 bomb attacks on public transport in London. We find reduced underground train travel and an increase in
rates of bicycling and, over the 6 months following the attacks, 214 additional bicyclist road casualties — a 15.4% increase.
Nevertheless we found no detectable increase in car accidents. We conclude that, while fear caused by terrorism may initiate
potentially dangerous behaviors, understanding the secondary effects of terrorism requires consideration of the environmental
variables that enable fear to manifest in dangerous behaviors.
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1 Introduction
Gigerenzer (2004, 2006) published evidence that the attacks
in the USA on September 11th 2001 caused substantially
greater loss of life than had been noticed via a secondary
psychological dread risk effect. People dread, and are es-
pecially averse to, situations where many may be harmed or
killed at one point in time, compared to situations in which a
similar or even greater number may be harmed or killed, but
distributed over a longer period (Slovic, 1987). Gigerenzer,
observing a decrease in air travel in the wake of the attacks
and a simultaneous increase in road traffic, claimed that some
people, seeking to avoid a dread risk, switched from flying
to driving. Calamitously, because driving is more dangerous
than flying (Myers, 2001), the switch resulted in more fatal-
ities than would have occurred if people had continued with
their previous pattern of travel. Gigerenzer (2004) estimated
the increase in road deaths in the three months following
September 11th 2001 was 353— exceeding the total number
of passengers killed on the four hijacked airplanes; subse-
quently Gigerenzer (2006) reported an increase of 1,595 in
traffic fatalities over the twelve months following the attacks
and attributed this increase to a dread risk effect.
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Gigerenzer’s (2004 & 2006) analyses compared the num-
ber of road fatalities for themonths following the attackswith
the numbers for the five preceding years, but did not report
any tests of statistical significance. Evidence that travel by
road increased was limited to comparison with the figures
for the period eight months before and twelve months after
the attacks – but again no tests of statistical significance were
reported. Motivated in part by the lack of tests of statisti-
cal significance in Gigerenzer’s analyses, Su, Tran, Wirtz,
Langteau & Rothman (2009) conducted more rigorous sta-
tistical analyses of the data.
Consistent with Gigerenzer’s (2004) descriptive findings,
one-way ANOVAs revealed that while the number of pre-
September passenger flying miles did not vary by year, the
number of U.S. domestic passenger flying miles in the post-
September months was significantly lower in 2001 than in
1999 and 2000. However Su et al. found no evidence to
support the second element of the dread risk effect — a
significant increase inmiles driven or of a significant increase
in traffic fatalities after September 11th.
Gigerenzer (2004) reported a 2.9% increase in total U.S.
driving miles in the post-September months of 2001, com-
pared with the post-September months of 2000, and con-
trasted this increase with the 0.9% increase in total driving
miles during the pre-September months of 2001, compared
with the same months in 2000. However, Su et al. noted the
presence of historical trends in U.S. driving such that, from
1970 through 2004, for a given month relative to that same
month in the previous year, drivingmiles increase on average
by 2.91%; hence the 2.9% increase in total driving miles be-
tween October and December of 2001 reported by Gigeren-
zer (2004) was quite close to expectations. Moreover, as total
U.S. driving miles in the post-September months of 2001 did
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not differ significantly from total U.S. driving miles in the
same months in 1999 and 2000, Su et al. rejected Gigeren-
zer’s claim that there was a notable increase in driving miles
in the United States after the September 11 attacks. Conse-
quently any change in the number of driving fatalities could
not be attributed to the dread risk effect – that is a switch
from flying to driving.
Su et al.’s statistical analyses also revealed that while the
number of fatal traffic accidents in the United States was
somewhat elevated during the last 3 months of 2001, there
was no significant overall increase in traffic fatalities. Su,
et al. also reported statistical analyses to test for a regional
increase in traffic fatalities in the post-September months
of 2001; citing survey evidence that proximity to the attacks
was associatedwith a greater stress reaction (Schlenger et al.,
2002) they hypothesized that stress induced by geographic
proximity to the attacks would decrease driving quality.
Su et al.’s analyses divided the United States into three
geographic regions and, consistent with their hypothesis,
found that traffic fatalities increased in the post-September
months of 2001 but only in the north-eastern portion of
the United States – the region where the attacks occurred.
As there was no corresponding significant increase in the
amount of driving in the Northeast during that period, and
also as the number of alcohol- or drug-related traffic citations
increased during the last 3 months of 2001, again only in the
Northeast of the USA, Su et al. argued for a different causal
account of the increased traffic fatalities: the traumatic effect
of the attacks increased psychological stress, which in turn
impaired driving ability and predisposed individuals to fatal
traffic accidents.
Critically for the dread risk hypothesis this interpretation
places the locus of the behavioral consequences of the USA
attacks on involuntary stress rather than on volitional choice.
Although Su et al.’s account of the increased fatalities at-
tributes them to dangerous behaviors induced by fear, it does
not imply any misguided attempt to avoid risk through vol-
untary decisions – specifically a switch in mode of travel.
This matters because, while interventions to reduce these
effects would of course be just as important, different sorts
of intervention may be appropriate to counter stress rather
than dread risk.
Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer (2012) responded to Su et al.’s
(2009) paper by conducting a more fine-grained analysis of
driving data. Analysing data across each of the 50 states plus
Washington, D.C., for the years 1996 to 2001 they found
that the average monthly increase in miles driven per in-
habitant in the post-September months of 2001 (27.2 miles)
was substantially (and significantly) larger than the aver-
age increase observed in the previous 5 years in those same
months (9.9 miles); while for the pre-September months,
the average monthly changes in miles driven in 2001 was
non-significantly lower than the average monthly changes in
the 5 previous years. Moreover while increased driving was
weakly associated with proximity to New York City, where
stress reactions to the attacks were previously shown to be
greatest (Schuster et al., 2001), it was much more strongly
associated with driving opportunity, operationalized either
as number of highway miles per inhabitant or as number of
car registrations per inhabitant. Increased driving, in turn,
was the best predictor of increased fatalities; Gaissmaier and
Gigerenzer’s analysis of state-by-state variations in changes
in fatalities after the attacks showed that fatalities increased
with changes in miles driven, but not with proximity to New
York City. Although traffic fatalities increased in the North-
east, substantial increases also occurred in many states more
distant from New York City, which, by virtue of their num-
ber of highway miles per inhabitant and/or number of car
registrations per inhabitant, afforded greater opportunity for
increased driving.1 Thus, Gaissmaier andGigerenzer (2012)
claimed a secondary impact of the terrorist attacks — which
increased fatalities - was attributable to both varying fear
of dread risks and variance in the environmental conditions
conducive to increased driving instead of flying.
López-Rousseau (2005) investigated whether any similar
effect occurred following the March 11th 2004 bomb attacks
on four trains in Spain which killed 191 people and injured
1,755. The effect was smaller and shorter than the American
reaction following September 11th 2001; train travel reduced
for just two months following the bombing. However, there
was no corresponding increase in road traffic; in fact, there
was a decrease. Accordingly traffic fatalities also decreased
and no secondary dread risk effect was observed.
Why were reactions to the attacks on the civilian pop-
ulations of the two countries different? One suggestion is
the socio-political differences between the countries: López-
Rousseau points out that, unlike the USA, Spain had been
exposed to decades of bomb attacks on public targets so one
attack may produce a smaller alarm reaction and less of a
dread risk. A possible reason why any — albeit reduced —
reaction did not result in secondary deaths is that Spain has
less of a car culture than the USA; Spaniards may not be so
willing or able to transfer from train to car when cars are less
available and public transport is more available.
In light of these observations we conducted an analysis
of the effects of the 2005 bomb attacks in London. On July
7th 2005, 52 people were killed and 700 were injured in four
separate explosions caused by bomb attacks on public trans-
portation in London. Bombs exploded on three underground
trains and on one bus. We focused our analysis of secondary
effects on London – the location of the bomb attacks.
Prompted by press reports of large increases in bicycle
sales immediately following the London attacks which sug-
gest that some switching from public transport to bicycles
1Baron’s (2004) analysis showing evidence for a stronger upturn in
fatal accidents involving out of state drivers, compared to fatal accidents
involving in-state drivers, is also consistent with the notion that there was a
switch from flying (commonly involving interstate travel) to driving.
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may have occurred (Muir, 2005) we examined variations in
bicycle travel and bicycle accidents.
People switching from underground trains to bicycles
could cause a secondary effect: just as car travel is riskier
than plane travel (Myers, 2001), bicycling is more dangerous
than traveling by underground train. Between 1997–2006
an annual average of 16 fatalities and 3,452 injuries were
recorded for London cyclists. Despite far more traveling by
underground than bicycle (1.1 million underground passen-
gers and 18,000 bicyclists travel daily into central London),
between 2000–2004 there was an annual average of six fa-
talities and 119 injuries on the underground. However note
that most underground fatalities are attributable to suicides
or follow deliberate trespass on the line (Transport for Lon-
don, 2007). Only five underground train accidents causing
passenger deaths have occurred since it opened in 1863. Lit-
man (2005) reports that, for London in 2004, the number of
deaths per billion trips was Underground (9.44); Bus (4.89)
and Bicycle (152.7).
We also analyzed London car accident data but couldn’t
detect any increase in car accidents following the London
attacks. Like Spain, the UK has less of a car culture than
the USA — particularly in London. Of those working in
central London, 80% travel to work by public transport (bus,
rail or underground); only 11% travel by car — compared
with 76% in the rest of Great Britain (Transport for London,
2007). For many Londoners driving is not feasible: cars
were charged (£8 — US$14 — at the time of the attacks) —
for entering central London during weekdays and parking is
scarce and costly. Nonetheless bicycling may be one option
for some public transport users.
2 Method And Results
To test for a secondary effect we analyzed four data sets:
recorded London underground passenger journeys, a London
bicycle survey, London car accident casualties and London
pedal-cyclist casualties. The underground passenger data
and bicycle survey were supplied to the authors on request
by Transport for London – the organization responsible for
public transport in London. The road casualties datasets,
compiled from reports made by police attending accidents,
are available from the UK government website (https://data.
gov.uk/).
Recorded underground passenger journeys were listed for
each of 13 four-week periods for 11 years (starting April
1st, ending March 31st) for the years 1995–1996 to 2005–6.
We computed thirteen regression models – one for each of
the 13 four-week periods – regressing passenger count onto
numerical year using data for the 10 years prior to the attacks
(1995–1996 to 2004–5). Each model fitted well (mean R2 =
0.75) to the historical counts of underground passengers.
Together these regression analyses modelled intra- and inter-
annual variance and, by substituting the year of the attacks
into each of the obtained regression equations, generated
predictions for the year of the attacks that we could compare
with the observed counts of underground passengers for the
year of the attacks (April 1st 2005 – March 31st 2006).
Predicted and observed counts are shown in the upper panel
of Figure 1.
We performed a similar analysis on the London bicycle
survey data. Whilst this survey does not purport to be rep-
resentative of London-wide bicycle levels it does represent
bicycle levels on the “red route network”—580 km of strate-
gic road (5% of total road length in London carrying 33%
of traffic by volume) managed by Transport for London. As
such, fluctuations in this survey could be seen as indicative
of fluctuations in bicycling levels in London. Regression
models fitted well to historical counts of bicyclists for each
of 13 four-week periods (mean R2=0.92) for the years from
period 13 of 1999–200 to period 8 of 2008–2009 excluding
the year of the attacks (2005–2006); this gave us models
based on eight years for periods 1–8 and period 13 and seven
years data for the remaining periods. We included data for
years following the year of the attacks due to the relatively
small number of years of data available for the years preced-
ing the attacks and in order to get good fits to the regression
models. Note that, while the years following the attacks
could conceivably reflect any impact of the attacks on lev-
els of bicycling, any upturn in those years would make any
upturn in the observed levels of bicycling in the year 2005–
2006 harder to detect as a disparity between predicted and
observed.
As with the counts of underground passengers, the regres-
sion models modeled intra- and inter-annual variance and
provided predictions for the year of the attacks that we could
compare with the observed counts of bicyclists for the year of
the attacks (April 1st 2005 –March 31st 2006); predicted and
observed counts are depicted in the second panel of Figure
1.
The July 7th attacks occurred nearly half way through
period 4 of 2005–6. The top panel of Figure 1 shows that
the observed number of underground journeys was close to
the predicted number for the first three periods of the year
(April 1st – June 24th) but below the predicted number from
period 4 of 2005–6 through to period 13 (June 25th 2005
– March 31st 2006); for period 6 (August 21-September 17
2005) observed journeys are outside the 95% interval. The
underground system operated a reduced service for a period
after the attacks but was fully operational by August 4th 2005
(Transport for London Press Release, 2005) so disruption to
service cannot account for this observation. Simultaneously,
observed numbers of cyclists (second panel Figure 1) closely
match predictions for the first three periods but are noticeably
above predictions from period 4 and for the remainder of
2005–6; for period 6 the observed count is above the 95%
confidence interval.
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Figure 1: Predicted and observed numbers of underground train travelers, cyclists, bicycle accident casualties and car
accident casualties in London. The predicted points for each period (month or 4-week period) are based on separate linear
regression models – one for each period - regressing the time series of historic annual data onto numerical year to infer the
slope and intercept in the historic data so as to extrapolate a prediction for the predicted year. * marks the temporal location
of July 7th 2005.
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To further test how the numbers of underground journeys
and numbers of bicycle journeys changed at the time of the at-
tacks we tested the relative accuracy of the forecasts of the re-
gression models for the time periods before and after the date
of the attacks. For underground journeys the discrepancy be-
tween predicted and actual was significantly greater for the
nine periods after the attacks than the three periods before
(Before: predicted = 235.2 million; before observed = 235.7
million; After predicted = 788.8 million; after observed =
733.2 million) χ2 (1) = 504,247, p<0.001. The models over-
predicted underground journeys after the attacks; across the
nine four-week periods after the attacks there were 55.6 mil-
lion (7.1%) fewer underground journeys than expected. For
bicycle journeys the models under-predicted bicycle jour-
neys after the attacks; across the nine four-week periods
after the attacks there were 98,638 (10.6%) more than ex-
pected. The discrepancy between predicted and actual was
significantly greater for the nine periods after the attacks
than the three periods before (Before predicted = 301,743;
before observed = 300,682; after predicted = 932,168; after
observed = 1,030,806) χ2 (1) = 1,249, p<.001.
We analyzed bicycle casualties by again using regression
models for historical counts for the ten calendar years 1995–
2004 to generate predictions for the year of the attacks. As
the bicycle casualty data were collated by calendar month per
calendar year rather than by the thirteen four week periods
used in the other data sets, we analyzed the data accordingly.
The third panel of Figure 1 shows that bicycle casualties (in-
juries including fatalities) increased in July, and were above
the levels predicted by the regression models we fitted for
each of the twelve calendar months (mean R2 = 0.75) for
all bar one of the months following July (September was a
marginal exception); August casualties exceeded themodel’s
95% confidence interval. As the July 7th attacks occurred
almost exactly half way through the year we compared the
differences between predicted and actual numbers of bicycle
casualties in each half of the year; casualties surpassed pre-
dictions significantly more during the second half of 2005
(predicted = 1390; observed = 1604) than the first half (pre-
dicted = 1256; observed = 1291), χ2 (1) = 4.597, p = 0.032,
indicating 214 (15.4%) additional casualties.
To investigate the link between changes in bicycling fre-
quency and changes in bicycle accident frequency we com-
puted the correlation between the historical variations in our
measures of bicycle journeys and bicycle accidents. Across
the 88 consecutive four-weekly periods from March 2nd,
2000 to June 9th 2007 the correlation was only modest —
r(86) = 0.24, p = 0.026. However, over that same time period,
bicycle journeys increased substantially yet, despite this, bi-
cycle accidents declined somewhat: while bicycle journeys
correlated positively with time measured in four-week pe-
riods, r(86) = 0.83, p<0.001; bicycle accidents correlated
negatively albeit non-significantly, r(86) = -0.20, p = 0.06.
Presumably some factor(s) exogenous to the relationship be-
tween bicycle journey frequency and bicycle accident fre-
quency affected the bicycle accident rate over time as their
partial correlation, controlling for the time variable, revealed
that the underlying relationship between bicycle journeys and
bicycle accidents was much stronger, r(85) = 0.66, p<0.001.
Our regression analyses of car accident casualties are de-
picted in the bottom panel of Figure 1; regression models
for each calendar month fitted well to historical data for the
five years from 2000–2004 (mean R2 = 0.86) and provided
predictions for 2005. As is evident from the figure, observed
car accident casualties do not show any noticeable increase
over predicted levels; indeed, levels of car accident casu-
alties appear somewhat below the predicted levels for the
second half of the year. Nonetheless, and in contrast with
the pattern for bicycle casualties, the discrepancy between
predicted and observed car accident casualties in the second
six months of the year (predicted = 7674; observed = 7502)
was not significantly greater than the discrepancy observed
in the first six months of the year (predicted=7362; observed
= 7275), χ2 (1) = 0.21, p = 0.65.
As a final point for this section we note that while our
method of using separate regression models of historic time
series data to generate predictions for each period (month or
4-week period) in the datasets analyzed here might seem un-
duly elaborate, it offers clear advantages over simpler meth-
ods suggested by one reviewer of this paper such as taking
the average of previous years. As noted above, along with
the seasonal variations within each year, there are also long
term trends over the years that would generate mispredic-
tions if a simple averaging approach was used. For example,
the annual count of bicycle accidents over ten years in the
data we analyzed shows a long term downward trend – for
each month there is a strong negative correlation between
the number of accidents and increasing numerical year –
(Pearson’s r between −0.758 and −0.967, mean = −0.86).
Our analyses show that, for each month, there is a strong
downward linear trend, and no evidence for a deviation from
linearity (see supplementary materials) which also confutes
the possibility raised by an anonymous reviewer that non-
linear trends in the historic data for bicycle accidents might
account for our observations.
3 Discussion
Our analyses establish a behavioral pattern consistent with
the dread risk effect. Although the pattern is for all casualties
not just fatalities, evidence of a secondary adverse effect of
the London attacks is discernible – though not in terms of an
increase in car accident casualties. Immediately following
the attacks of July 7th, Londoners simultaneously reduced
their travel on underground trains by 7.1% and over the same
period increased their travel on bicycles by 10.6% resulting in
an increase in the number of bicycle road accident casualties;
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in the second half of 2005 bicycle accident casualties were
15.4% higher than predicted. While the usual caveats of
correlational data apply, this pattern of change is consistent
with a dread risk effect – that, in the wake of the attacks,
some people switched their travel from underground trains
to bicycles and that, as a consequence, the London bomb
attacks caused a mediated secondary casualty toll estimated
at 214 additional casualties.
A question arises as to why the measures of secondary
effects following attacks on public targets are as variable as
they appear to be. To wit, no secondary effect on casualties
was measurable in Spain following the 2004 Madrid attacks
(López-Rousseau, 2005) but an effect was reported follow-
ing the 2001 attacks in the USA (Gaissmaier & Gigeren-
zer, 2012) and a discernible effect of the London attacks
is reported here for bicycle casualties but not car casual-
ties. Doubtless many factors could potentially account for
varying reactions to different attacks. As mentioned it is
possible that experience of attacks may reduce the dread risk
reaction (López-Rousseau, 2005; Yechiam, Barron & Erev,
2005). Familiarity with such attacks may result in reduced
dread risk, however the study into the effects of the attacks
in Spain did not report any measures of dread (such as a
survey of public attitudes) and other factors could account
for the differences. For example, if economic, social and
geographical circumstances are such that air travel is more
discretionary and substitutable by driving for American air-
plane passengers than train travel is by driving for Spanish
train travelers, we need not assume that experience of attacks
reduces dread. Like Spain, the UK (including London) had
experienced decades of bomb attacks and we were able to
detect a behavioural pattern consistent with a secondary ef-
fect in London – albeit not in terms of an increase in car
accident casualties. This nuanced pattern, while hardly pro-
bative, fits Gaissmaier & Gigerenzer’s, (2012) notion that
an environmental structure that enables fear to manifest in
dangerous behavior is critical for dread risk effects.
Yechiam et al. (2005) investigated the impact of the pro-
longed wave of attacks in Israel known as Al-Aqsa Intifada,
where attacks were targeted toward specific civilian targets in
eachmonth that led to fatalities between September 2000 and
October 2003. These authors suggested that, while attacks
create phobia-like responses, experience with the environ-
ment could provide a therapeutic-like process that reduces
the long-term effects of terrorism. Yechiam et al. reasoned
that, during the Intifada, Israelis had to decide between a safe
alternative (e.g., “stay at home”) and a riskier alternative that
exposed the decision maker to a small probability of being
attacked. Yechiam et al. argued that most occasions when
local residents went to a public place (walking in the street
or sitting in a café), implying selection of the risky alter-
native, usually resulted in a “good” outcome – no attack –
which would reinforce the tendency to participate in similar
activities in the future.
Consistent with this notion Yechiam et al. found that Is-
raeli hotel visits by tourists from abroad sharply decreased
but that hotel visits by native Israelis hardly reduced during
the Intifada. This might reflect, as they suggest, reduced
dread in those exposed to risk without suffering bad out-
comes compared to those tourists from abroad who avoided
exposure to the risk and therefore did not obtain any positive
experience from surviving it. However Yechiam et al. also
had no direct measures of dread and, as they note, the cost
of avoiding a risky area is much higher for local residents
than to potential visitors from abroad who, presumably, in
many cases, can simply select a different vacation location.
For many Israelis the risks of a hotel visit when they already
live in a threatened area were very marginal. Accordingly
it is possible that dread was not diminished in the manner
suggested.
Critically for understanding their implications, the obser-
vational studies in the USA, Spain, Israel and London are
essentially correlational; lacking experimental controls, they
do not exclude alternative explanations for the observed asso-
ciations between attacks and public behavior. Consequently
caution is needed before inferring any particular causal ac-
count. For example, it is possible that the observed reduc-
tion in plane travel observed in the USA in the wake of the
September 11th 2001 attacks was not due to dread at all but
to aversion to the inconvenience that the increased security
arrangements2 brought to air travel (see Blalock, Kadiyali
& Simon, 2007). Although in the present case it is difficult
to see any rival causal account for the observed pattern —
for example, in the wake of the London attacks there was no
corollary inconvenience caused by increases in security for
traveling on the London underground—we cannot establish
conclusively that dread effects were responsible for a switch
– or even, strictly, that any people at all actually “switched”
travelling from underground to bicycle.
One putative defence of the rationality of a switch from
public transport to bicycling is that cycling confers health
benefits that outweigh the risks from higher exposure to air
pollution and traffic accidents. While there is evidence that
this may be true in the Netherlands (de Hartog, Boogaard,
Nijland&Hoek, 2010), there is no evidence on the equivalent
position in London where both air pollution (see de Hartog
et al, 2010) and traffic accident risk (Pucher & Buehler,
2008) are considerably higher. Nevertheless, irrespective of
any cost benefit analysis, any switch to bicycling triggered
by the bomb attacks would somewhat undermine the health
benefits defence of the rationality of the human response
2Regulatory arrangements are one way in which dread risk could influ-
ence institutional policies that stimulate maladaptive switching in individ-
uals – for example, following the Hatfield rail crash in October 2000, the
UK rail regulator introduced speed restrictions on trains causing significant
delays on many routes which some claimed led to frustrated rail passengers
switching to riskier road travel causing additional deaths (The Economist,
2000).
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to risks: why wait for a terror attack before evaluating the
options for getting fit?
Another reservation that deserves consideration is the idea
that although switching to riskier forms of transport appears
maladaptive, this evaluation relies on the benefit of hindsight
inasmuch as the attacks might have heralded a change in the
actuarial landscape; if attacks had subsequently recurred to a
significant extent then such transport switchesmight not have
been so ill advised. Indeed, 14 weeks after the September
11th 2001 attacks in the USA, there was a failed attempt
to blow up an American passenger airliner in midair and
two weeks after the July 7th attacks in London there were
four failed attempted bomb attacks, on one day, in London
on public transport that mirrored the pattern of the July 7th
attacks in that three were on underground trains and one was
on a bus. However, as it turned out, in both cases, there were
no repeat events to cause a sea change in the statistical risks.
The question of how to respond to unusual events has
parallels with the question posed by Paul Meehl in his pa-
per “When shall we use our heads instead of the formula?”
(Meehl, 1957). Acknowledging that there will be cases
where so-called “broken leg cues”3 can invalidate actuarially
based predictions, Meehl argued that, nevertheless, the occa-
sions when people should use judgment to overrule statistics
should be “very very seldom” (p. 273). Yet, and contrary
to Meehl’s prescription, abundant evidence indicates that
people very readily eschew statistics in favor of judgment
based on more individuated features of events. Exemplary
cases include, the strong tendency to discount historical data
when forecasting (e.g., Kahneman&Lovallo, 1993; Buehler,
Griffin & Ross, 2002); the curiously incurious interest in the
statistical probabilities of winning shown by even experi-
enced gamblers (e.g., Wagenaar, 1989; Clotfelter & Cook,
1990) and people’s widespread ignorance of statistical risks
— for instance, Gigerenzer (2006) argued that few people
will be aware that the probability of losing one’s life is about
the same for driving 12 miles by car as for a nonstop flight
from Boston to Los Angeles (Sivak & Flannagan, 2003) —
will all usually be to the detriment of decisions under risk.
Claims that, in response to the risk of terror attacks, the
vast sums spent by governments and other institutions on avi-
ation security and other counter-measures could have been
spent far more effectively (Linos, Linos & Colditz, 2007;
Stewart & Mueller, 2008; 2013) suggest that dread risk may
also adversely drive institutional policies to the detriment
of many individuals. For example, Stewart and Mueller’s
(2008) cost-benefit analyses of the increased US homeland
security expenditure following the 9/11 attacks estimated
that the annual cost per life saved ranged from $64 million to
$600 million, far above the regulatory safety goal (societal
3Meehl (1954) explained that no sensible sociologist with a successfully
cross validated statistical model, predicting a 90% likelihood that Professor
X would visit the cinema on a particular night, would stick with the model
if he learned that Professor X had just broken his leg.
willingness to pay to save a life) of $1–$10 million per life
saved.
Finally we note that, while the evidence for dread risk
effects in the wake of terrorism is correlational, experimen-
tal studies of decisions under risk show that risky choices
depend on affective reactions (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee &
Welch, 2001). Specifically consistent with dread risk effects,
Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) show, for “affect-rich” rather
than “affect-poor” events, more pronounced overweighting
of small probabilities and less sensitivity to probability vari-
ation (though see Klein et al., (2018) for a contrary finding).
Assuming terrorism evokes emotion, this pattern of “proba-
bility neglect” (Sunstein, 2002) could at least contribute to
dread risk reactions to terror attacks. Further analyses of
behavioral consequences of the discretionary choices people
are free to make in reaction to dreaded events may reveal
other secondary effects.
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